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Dynamic Game Theory Syllabus

by David K. Levine

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This class studies noncooperative game theory, especially the theory of dynamic games. Dynamic models of long-run versus short-run players, repeated games with and without moral hazard, reputation models, evolution and learning in games and experimental game theory will be covered. Depth of understanding will be emphasized at the expense of breadth of coverage.

There will be four required problem sets and a paper. The problem sets will be graded on the basis of whether you made an effort to do the problems and not whether or not you got the right answers. The correct answers will be discussed in class or review session, or answers will be circulated. The problem sets will count 50% of the grade and the paper the remaining 50%. If you do not wish to take the field, you may substitute a take-home exam for the paper. The take home exam will be issued on the next to last day of class, and the paper and take-home final are due at 9 pm on the final day of class.

All assignments must be turned in by email in pdf format.

Much basic material can be found in the text Game Theory by Fudenberg and Tirole. You may also find Myerson's Game Theory text a useful reference. Material on learning is covered in detail in Fudenberg and Levine Theory of Learning in Games. The actual class reading will be selected from the attached more extensive lists.

The field paper or take home exam is due: FRIDAY, MARCH 17, 2006, 9:00 PM.