

# The Largesse Design Problem

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## Abstract

Largesse design asks what happens when players in a game, who have a limited willingness to sacrifice for the common good, can coordinate on a welfare-optimal solution. This theory provides an alternative to psychological theories in explaining why players engage in costly punishments and rewards. It also says that players will engage in other low-cost methods of encouraging pro-social behavior, for example, through reputation effects. In this paper, I study the properties and comparative statics of the largesse design problem. Despite a lack of concavity in the maximization problem, solutions are unique and continuous except on a lower-dimensional bifurcation set. In examples, I study these bifurcations, in which a small change in the parameters can lead to a large changes in behavior or welfare.

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## 1. Introduction

Largesse design asks what happens in a game in which three assumptions are satisfied. First, some players are willing to sacrifice a limited amount of utility, their *largesse*, for the common good. Second, they agree on a common goal, social welfare measured *ex ante*, before their roles are determined. Third, they are good at solving coordination problems. Hence, largesse design asks what is the maximum welfare achievable, and how should players play to achieve that welfare, given that, for each person, there is an incentive constraint, that they cannot sacrifice more utility than they are willing to. Harsanyi (1982) called this rule utilitarianism, and in the voting literature, Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) refer to it as the ethical voters model.

Largesse design problems have been studied in the context of voting by Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) and Dutta, Levine and Modica (2021), in the context of public goods, and computationally by Levine (2025). In the voting literature the interaction between groups, each of which solves a largesse design problem, has been studied by Coate and Conlin (2004), Herrera, Morelli and Nunnari (2016), and by Levine and Mattozzi (2020). Comparative statics, the mapping from parameters to solutions, has not been extensively studied and is the focus of this paper.

The largesse design problem is difficult, because the constraint set need not be convex, and the objective function need not be concave. Nevertheless all are defined by polynomials, so the relevant sets and mappings are semi-algebraic. In particular, I show that, except on a lower-dimensional bifurcation set, the map from parameters to solutions is single-valued and continuous. I also show that these results extend to the generalized largesse design problem, in which there is a cost of providing largesse, as well as a constraint on the amount of largesse provided.

The bifurcation set is of particular importance, as bifurcations have been seen to occur in the laboratory. This is the case in the stag hunt data in Figure 2.1 below, where modest changes in payoffs shifts most player from playing hare, to most players playing stag. There are other examples. For instance, in the centipede game, increasing the stakes, or changing the payoffs in the final round, generally causes the number of rounds before players grab to switch from relatively high to relatively low.<sup>2</sup> Outside the laboratory, bifurcations (or threshold effects, which are the same thing) have been used to explain phenomena such as mass protests and bank runs.

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<sup>2</sup>See McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Maniadis (2011), and Cox and James (2015).

In addition to the generic single-valuedness and continuity of the solution correspondence, I establish other general results about the largesse design problem. Two of these are straightforward but useful. First, is establishing the utility transforms under which the feasible set, and those under which the solution set, remain unchanged. Second, is demonstrating the monotonicity of the feasible set and of welfare as largesse is increased. Finally, if each player has a distribution of largesse, I show that replacing each type with a single type that has the average largesse, can only increase welfare. I then give conditions under which welfare and aggregate play remain unchanged, as the largesse distribution is altered. In particular, if a player is playing a best response with positive probability, then there is a range of largesse distributions which do not change the solution.

I study several applications. I am particularly interested in games involving punishments (similar to ultimatum bargaining and public goods) and rewards (similar to trust and gift exchange). These are games which have been used in the laboratory to show that people are not entirely self-interested. These laboratory studies have been used as the basis for various psychological theories of preferences for fairness and reciprocity, such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), and others. I show that largesse design provides an alternative explanation: that players strategically engage in punishments and rewards to provide incentives for prosocial behavior.

Largesse design theory is about deploying largesse strategically. As a motivating example, I consider a simple punisher's dilemma game, in which a second player can strategically punish a first player, for antisocial behavior. This game is designed to highlight the differences with existing theories. Selfish players, altruistic players, and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) fairness players never punish. In the solution to the largesse design problem, when largesse is low, the second player does not punish, and the first player engages in a low level of prosocial behavior, much as a mildly altruistic player would. As largesse increases, there is a bifurcation, and it becomes optimal for the second player to begin punishing the first player for antisocial behavior. This leads to a rapid increase in welfare as largesse increases. After the punishment is enough to induce the first player to act prosocially with probability one, as largesse increases further, additional, smaller, gains take place, as the second player reduces the socially costly punishments.

The second application considers a symmetric public goods game in which there

are three choices: to free ride, to contribute to the public good, or to contribute to the public good and punish free-riders. As in the case of the simple punisher's dilemma, there is a bifurcation. With three actions it is more dramatic. A small increase in largesse not only changes behavior from free riding to punishing, but welfare also jumps up discontinuously when this occurs.

The final application looks at an alternative way in which largesse can be used strategically to encourage players to behave prosocially. Largesse design is a theory of commitment with an *ex ante* constraint on the amount that players are willing to lose. Reputation theory is based on the existence of at least a small number of committed players. I show how, in largesse design, the endogenous commitment of a few players, with relatively small largesse, can be bootstrapped to give good welfare results in a game between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run opponents.

## 2. Literature Review

Before proceeding, I would like to convince you that the theory is relevant. I hope I do not have to convince you that some people are willing to make limited sacrifices for the common good.

With respect to social welfare as a criterion, I am going to observe that in laboratory studies (see in particular the review by Fehr and Charness (2024)) people care about both efficiency and fairness. With risk averse individuals, social welfare is a parsimonious model of people who care about both. Greater efficiency raises welfare, and, with risk aversion, greater fairness corresponds to better insurance and also raises welfare. I am not going to argue that people necessarily agree that *ex ante* social welfare is the right goal. Rather, I am going to propose it is a reasonable criterion, and I am going to ask what happens they do. I will note as well, that in the symmetric case *ex ante* social welfare is compelling, and I am careful to show that key results continue to hold, when limited to symmetric games. To this I will add that in Levine (2025) I show that it works well in explaining laboratory behavior.

I feel I do need to convince you that people are good at solving coordination problems, both inside and outside the laboratory. This is in light of the fact that, in the experimental lab, beginning with Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990)'s study of the minimum game, coordination failures have been documented, and indeed there are a variety of theories, risk dominance and global games most prominently, that aim to predict when coordination failure will occur.

I am going to propose that these failures of coordination are not due to the inability of people to coordinate, but rather that, in the laboratory, as well as outside, the environment is noisy. Let me start with the Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) minimum game, with 15 or more players, in which it is observed that experienced players, rather than coordinating on the welfare-optimal highest level of effort, instead only manage the least level of effort. My observation is this: with 15 or more players, in a game where only the minimum level of contribution to a public good matters, then if players tremble, it is highly likely that one will ruin things for everybody.

Specifically, (see Levine (2025)) if  $1/3$  of the players tremble uniformly then, in fact, the only equilibrium is for all non-trembling players to provide the least effort. Hence, in the relevant normal form, the one with trembling, they do coordinate on the welfare-optimal equilibrium, as there is only one equilibrium. Now  $1/3$  of the players trembling uniformly may seem like a lot: 29% of the time they should be playing more than the least level of effort. In fact, in the Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) data in the final of ten periods, and despite the fact that in the previous six periods the minimum level of effort was the least possible; 29% are providing more than the least level and, indeed, 10% are providing the highest level.

I turn next to two meta-studies. The first is a meta-study of  $2 \times 2$  stag hunt experiments by Dal Bo, Frechette and Kim (2021). These are strangers' treatments in which players played at least eight times. In this game, the welfare optimum is for all to hunt stag, and the basin is defined as the greatest probability of hare that makes it optimal for all to hunt stag. The second is a meta-study of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiments by Levine (2024). These are strangers' treatments in which players played at least fifteen times. Here I follow the literature in defining the basin with respect to the  $2 \times 2$  game in which the strategies or grim-trigger and always defect. I report welfare with utility normalized, as is standard in the literature, to zero for mutual defection and one for mutual cooperation. This is the same as the cooperation rate if play is perfectly correlated or if the off-diagonal welfare is  $1/2$  and is highly correlated with the cooperation rate.

Below, in Figure 2.1, I report the theory and the data for the different games and treatments. On the horizontal axis is the basin of the treatment, on the vertical axis is the fraction of time the players chose stag for the stag hunt games and the normalized welfare for the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. The red correspondence is the best equilibrium when players tremble uniformly  $1/3$ rd of the

time. The blue correspondence is the predicted probability from both risk dominance and global games, which are the same in this setting, and both of which predict the “good” equilibrium of stag or grim-trigger if the basin is greater than 50%, and the bad equilibrium of hare or “always defect” if the basin is less than 50%.




Figure 2.1: Stag Hunt and Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Meta-studies

dots: data

blue: risk dominance/global games

red: best equilibrium with  $1/3$  probability of uniform tremble

left panel: stag hunt treatments, period 8

vertical axis: frequency of stag

right panel: indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma treatments, all periods starting in period 10

vertical axis: welfare with payoff to mutual defection normalized to zero and mutual cooperation to one

I believe that these two graphs show that best equilibrium with trembling is a viable alternative to risk dominance and global games for explaining what happens in coordination games.

Beyond this, I have documented in Levine (2025) that a simple theory of  $1/3$  uniform trembling in a largesse design problem in which half the population is selfish, and half have a largesse of roughly \$1.00 over the course of play, does a good job in

predicting the play of experimental participants across a wide variety of experiments. This built on earlier work by Dutta, Levine and Modica (2021), in which we examined the largesse design problem both inside and outside the laboratory.

### *Outside the Laboratory*

Outside the laboratory, two Nobel prizes have been awarded for documenting the ability of people to coordinate on good equilibria: Coase (1960) and Ostrom (1990). I would add to this also the work of Townsend (1994) on insurance in rural societies. Indeed: the entire premise of contract theory is that people are pretty good at figuring out good solutions to social dilemmas. Outside the laboratory, of course, more time is available, and people can talk, but the problems tend to be more complex. The success of market design as a commercial enterprise convinces me of two things. First, people cannot necessarily solve hard problems, but they would like to.

In voting theory, the theory of ethical voters or rule utilitarianism, which gives rise to the largesse design problem have been studied theoretically by Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), and empirically by Coate and Conlin (2004). Subsequently the model has been widely used by other authors, such as Herrera, Morelli and Nunnari (2016).

As I indicated, the idea of largesse design is closely connected to the idea of rule utilitarianism. This is an idea dating back to Mill (1861), and is described by Garner and Rosen (1967) as “the rightness or wrongness of a particular action is a function of the correctness of the rule of which it is an instance.” This is in contrast to act utilitarianism, a more commonly used concept in economics. The difference between the two ideas can be illustrated by the punishment of a free-rider in a public good game. As an act this is unambiguously bad, as it lowers welfare. However, used as a rule, it can be good, because it encourages people to contribute to the public good. The idea that rule utilitarianism is an individualistic way to solve coordination problems was studied in Harsanyi (1982).

Finally, the feasible set for the largesse design problem has a close connection to the idea of  $\epsilon$ -equilibrium, introduced in Radner (1980). In largesse design each type of each player can have a different value of  $\epsilon$  and it need not be small, but the relaxation of the constraints through largesse is exactly that from  $\epsilon$ -equilibrium.

### 3. The Model

The setting is that of a normal form game. There are  $n$  players and each player has a finite strategy space  $s^i \in S^i$  with payoffs  $u^i(s^i, s^{-i})$ . The space of pure strategy profiles is denoted by  $S$ . If there are trembles, then strategies represent intentions, and the normal form is the corresponding expected utility, that is, trembles are taken to already be incorporated into the normal form of the game.

Each player has a finite type space  $T^i$  with types denoted by  $\tau$ . Denote the set of all types by  $T = \cup_{i=1}^n T^i$ . The fraction of type  $\tau$  is denoted by  $\phi_\tau \geq 0$  where the fractions of types of a single player add up to one: for each  $i$  it is the case that  $\sum_{\tau \in T^i} \phi_\tau = 1$ . Each type is characterized by a non-negative largesse  $\gamma_\tau \geq 0$ . Types are private information.

Let  $\sigma_\tau^i$  denote a mixed strategy for type  $\tau \in T^i$ , and let  $\sigma$  be a vector of such mixed strategies. Denote by  $\Sigma$  the corresponding set of profiles. Define the induced mixture from all types of player  $i$  by  $\bar{\sigma}^i = \sum_{\tau \in T^i} \phi_\tau \sigma_\tau^i$ . For a given vector  $\sigma \in \Sigma$  of mixed strategies for each player and type let  $u^i(\sigma_\tau^i, \bar{\sigma}^{-i})$  be the expected utility of type  $\tau$  of player  $i$ . Given  $\sigma$  each type  $\tau \in T^i$  of player  $i$  faces an incentive constraint that the gain from deviating is no greater than  $\gamma_\tau$

$$g_\tau(\sigma) \equiv \max_{s^i \in S^i} u^i(s^i, \bar{\sigma}^{-i}) - u^i(\sigma_\tau^i, \bar{\sigma}^{-i}) \leq \gamma_\tau.$$

If this is satisfied for all players and types then  $\sigma$  is called incentive-compatible. If  $\gamma_\tau = 0$  for all  $\tau$ , then incentive compatibility is the same as Nash equilibrium.

Expected per capita *social welfare* from  $\sigma$  is given by

$$W(\sigma) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\tau \in T^i} \phi_\tau u^i(\sigma_\tau^i, \bar{\sigma}^{-i}) / n = \sum_{i=1}^n u^i(\bar{\sigma}) / n.$$

The *largesse design problem* is to find the  $\sigma$  that maximizes social welfare subject to incentive compatibility. If  $\gamma_\tau = 0$  for all  $\tau$  this is the same as choosing the welfare-optimal Nash equilibrium.

Note that this welfare function is less restrictive than it seems. If we wish, we can introduce an “inactive” player, such as the receiver in the dictator game, who has only one action, but cares about the actions of the other. Since this player cares about the outcomes, we may manipulate the utility of that player to design any welfare function we wish, without changing the strategic nature of the game.

Several special cases are of particular interest. If there is only one type of each player we say that largesse is *unitary*, and replace the redundant type subscript  $\tau$  in  $\gamma_\tau$  with the player superscript,  $\gamma^i$ . If each player draws from the same distribution of types we say that *largesse is symmetric*. A type with largesse  $\gamma_\tau = 0$  is called *selfish*.

#### 4. The Punisher's Dilemma

The punisher's dilemma is a  $2 \times 2$  game. The first player, called the US, chooses between (Fi)ghting and (Co)nceding, and the second player, called the SU, chooses between (St)anding aside, and (Pu)nishing. Punishing involves building a doomsday machine. Take first the case where the SU stands aside. If the US fights both get 4. If the US concedes they get less, 3, but the SU gets more, 7. Conceding is welfare superior, as it avoid the cost of fighting.

On the other hand, it costs 1 to build a doomsday machine. This machine will be activated only if the US fights, in which case it will explode, causing 2 units of damage to the US (and none to the SU). This is summarized in the payoffs matrix in Table 4.1 below.

	<i>St</i>	<i>Pu</i>
<i>Fi</i>	4, 4	2, 3
<i>Co</i>	3, 7	3, 6

Table 4.1: Punisher's Dilemma Game"

A key fact about this game is that a selfish, altruistic, or Fehr and Schmidt (1999) fairness SU will never build a doomsday machine. For selfish SU, standing aside, *St* strictly dominates building a doomsday machine. Moreover, it strictly dominates from a welfare point of view as well, so an altruistic SU would also never build a doomsday machine. For a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) fairness SU when the US plays *Fi* the choice *St* is strictly better from a fairness point of view. When the US plays *Co* the gain in fairness to the US from the SU punishing is 1 and the cost to the SU is 1 and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that no player would make such a trade-off.

Notice that when the SU is playing *St* neither the selfish nor Fehr and Schmidt (1999) US would play *Co* so that the unique outcome is *FiSt*.

In contrast to the other theories, largesse design predicts that doomsday machines will sometimes be built. Specifically, I analyze the unitary symmetric case, in which there is one type of each player, and both have the same largesse:  $\gamma^1 = \gamma^2 = \bar{\gamma}$ .

Figure 4.1 below summarizes Proposition 4.1 below, characterizing the solution of the largesse design problem.




Figure 4.1: Punisher's Dilemma Game

vertical axis: welfare measured as fraction of difference between *FiSt* and *CoSt*

horizontal axis:  $\bar{\gamma}$

solid line: welfare from the solution of largesse design problem

dotted line: welfare from the largesse of player 1 only ( $\gamma^2 = 0$ )

red:  $\sigma_P^2$ , the probability of *Pu* in the solution of largesse design problem

Denote by  $\sigma_C^1$  and  $\sigma_P^2$  the probabilities of the (single types of) US conceding and of the SU of building a doomsday machine. The cost of building a doomsday machine is 1, so the incentive constraint for the SU is  $\sigma_P^2 \leq \bar{\gamma}$ . For low levels of largesse,  $\bar{\gamma}$ , the cost from this low level of punishment is too great to justify the small improvement in incentives for the US. Hence the optimum is to take  $\sigma_P^2 = 0$  and rely solely on the largesse of the US to get a low level of concession. When  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/4$  this changes, and there is a bifurcation, two equally good solutions, one with  $\sigma_P^2 = 0$  and one with  $\sigma_P^2 = \bar{\gamma}$ . Beyond this point it is better to use punishment, and  $\sigma_P^2$  jumps up. As  $\bar{\gamma}$  rises, so does  $\sigma_P^2$ , and welfare rises rapidly. Always,  $\sigma_C^1$  is chosen as large as is feasible. At  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/3$ , this maximum feasible  $\sigma_C^1$  reaches 1. After this  $\sigma_P^2$  should be reduced to avoid a costly and unnecessary punishment. Note that this “least possible punishment” is characteristic of the largesse design problem.

Notice in particular the subtle behavior of  $\sigma_P^2$ . It is initially zero. At  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/4$  it jumps up, then rises linearly until  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/3$ , following which it declines linearly. I will show later that this behavior - a solution that is unique and continuous except on a lower-dimensional bifurcation set (here  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/4$ ) - is typical of solutions of the largesse design problem. Notice that in this case behavior, as measured by  $\sigma$  bifurcates, but welfare is continuous. I will refer to such a case as a *behavioral bifurcation*. As I will show later, there can also be *welfare bifurcations*, in which welfare jumps.

To understand a bit better why doomsday machines are useful for the largesse design problem, focus on the case in which  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/2$ . If no doomsday machine is built, the US must satisfy  $\gamma_C^1 \leq 1/2$  so the highest possible (total, not average) welfare is  $1/2$  of 8 and  $1/2$  of 10, which is to say 9. By contrast, with  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/2$  the SU could build a doomsday machine with probability  $\sigma_P^2 = 1/2$  which would make the US indifferent between fighting and conceding. The welfare optimum is when they concede, in which case welfare is 50 – 50 between *CoSt* and *CoPu*, which is to say 9.5, definitely better than the 9 that can be obtained using solely US largesse. Notice, though, that when  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/2$  the optimal choice of  $\sigma_P^2 \neq 1/2$ . Because they have largesse, the US is willing to concede with probability 1 even if it involves a loss. That is, their constraint is strictly satisfied. Hence,  $\sigma_P^2$  should be reduced until the US constraint is satisfied with equality, raising welfare by reducing the cost of punishment.

These results are summarized in Proposition 4.1 below.

**Proposition 4.1.** *There are five regions*

- i.  $\bar{\gamma} < 1/4$ , the solution is unique,  $\sigma_C^1 = \bar{\gamma}$ ,  $\sigma_P^2 = 0$  and  $2W = 8 + 2\bar{\gamma}$
- ii.  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/4$ , there are two solutions  $\sigma_C^1 = 1/4$ ,  $\sigma_P^2 = 0$  and  $\sigma_C^1 = 1/2$ ,  $\sigma_P^2 = 1/4$ , and both give welfare  $2W = 8.5$ .
- iii.  $1/4 < \bar{\gamma} \leq 1/3$ , the solution is unique,  $\sigma_C^1 = \bar{\gamma}/(1 - 2\bar{\gamma})$ ,  $\sigma_P^2 = \bar{\gamma}$  and  $2W = 8 - 3\bar{\gamma} + 2\bar{\gamma}(1 + \bar{\gamma})/(1 - 2\bar{\gamma})$
- iv.  $1/3 \leq \bar{\gamma} < 1$ , the solution is unique,  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$ ,  $\sigma_P^2 = (1 - \bar{\gamma})/2$  and  $2W = 9.5 + \bar{\gamma}/2$
- v.  $\bar{\gamma} \geq 1$ , the solution is unique and first-best,  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$ ,  $\sigma_P^2 = 0$  and  $2W = 10$

The proof will show that the bifurcation at  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/4$  occurs because at this point there is a convex objective function that is indifferent between two end points, and the solution jumps from one end to the other on either side of  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/4$ .

*Proof.* The objective function is

$$2W = 8 - 3\sigma_P^2 + 2\sigma_C^1(1 + \sigma_P^2).$$

The incentive constraint for 2 is  $\sigma_P^2 \leq \bar{\gamma}$ .

If in a solution  $C$  is a best response, then  $\sigma_P^1 \geq 1/2$ , and this implies  $\bar{\gamma} \geq 1/2$ . It follows that  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$ , since this certainly satisfies the incentive constraints and maximizes welfare. Welfare is then  $2W = 10 - \sigma_P^2$ , so it is desirable to decrease  $\sigma_P^1$ . If  $\sigma_P^1 > 1/2$  this cannot be optimal. Moreover, since  $\bar{\gamma} \geq 1/2$  it is possible to lower  $\sigma_P^1$  further without violating the incentive constraint for player 1.

It follows that  $F$  is always a best response in any solution. Hence the incentive constraint for player 1 is

$$\sigma_C^1(1 - 2\sigma_P^2) \leq \bar{\gamma}. \quad (4.1)$$

If the incentive constraint for player 1 does not bind, welfare can be improved by increasing  $\sigma_C^1$ , since this increase does not affect the constraint for player 2. Hence either the constraint binds or  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$ . If  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$  welfare can be improved by decreasing  $\sigma_P^2$ , so if the constraint does not bind, then  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$  and  $\sigma_P^2 = 0$ . This is feasible if and only if  $\bar{\gamma} \geq 1$  which is case (v).

Assume, then, that the incentive constraint for player 1 does bind. Solve it to find

$$\sigma_C^1 = \frac{\bar{\gamma}}{1 - 2\sigma_P^2} \quad (4.2)$$

if  $\sigma_P^2 < (1 - \bar{\gamma})/2$ . In this case welfare is given by

$$2W = 8 - 3\sigma_P^2 + 2\bar{\gamma} \frac{1 + \sigma_P^2}{1 - 2\sigma_P^2}.$$

It can be checked that the second derivative is positive. In other words, along the curve where the incentive constraint for player 1 binds, the objective function is convex. Hence the solution lies at one end or the other: either take  $\sigma_P^2 = 0$  or take it as large as is feasible, that is,  $\sigma_P^2 = \bar{\gamma}$ . This leads to a simple type of bifurcation where the parameters push the convex objective function through a point where the two ends are indifferent.

To find the full solution, compute welfare difference between the upper end at

$\sigma_P^2 = \bar{\gamma}$  and the lower end  $\sigma_P^2 = 0$  as

$$-5\bar{\gamma} + 2\bar{\gamma} \frac{1 + \bar{\gamma}}{1 - 2\bar{\gamma}}.$$

This has a root at  $\bar{\gamma} = 0$  and at  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/4$ , and is negative in between. Hence the optimum is the lower end at  $\sigma_P^2 = 0$  for  $\bar{\gamma} < 1/4$ , and there is a bifurcation when indifference occurs at  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/4$ . This gives case (i) and half of case (ii).

For  $\bar{\gamma} \geq 1/4$  and  $\sigma_C^1 < 1$  it is then optimal to choose  $\sigma_P^2$  as large as possible, that is,  $\sigma_P^2 = \bar{\gamma}$ . From 4.2 this gives

$$\sigma_C^1 = \frac{\bar{\gamma}}{1 - 2\bar{\gamma}}.$$

Observing that this equals 1 at  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/3$  gives the rest of case (ii) and case (iii).

Once  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$  welfare is  $2W = 10 - \sigma_P^2$ , so  $\sigma_P^2$  should be chosen as small as possible, which, from 4.1 is  $\sigma_P^2 = (1 - \bar{\gamma})/2$ . As this is equal to 0 at  $\bar{\gamma} = 1$ , that completes case (iv).  $\square$

## 5. Theory

I give here the main results of the paper. First I establish the basic features of the existence and monotonicity of solutions. Then I analyze comparative statics. First I establish the utility perturbations to which solutions are invariant, then I prove the main result about generic uniqueness and continuity of solutions. Finally, I consider robustness with respect to perturbations in the distribution of types.

### 5.1. Existence, Monotonicity, and the First-Best

The existence of a solution is fundamental and fairly obvious. For completeness I prove this in the Appendix.

**Proposition 5.1.** *(i) The incentive-compatible set is compact and non-empty. A solution to the largesse design problem exists, and the set of solutions is compact.*

*(ii) For a fixed normal form game and the distribution of types, and suppose that  $\gamma' \geq \gamma$ . Then the welfare  $W'$  from the solution of the  $\gamma'$  problem satisfies  $W' \geq W$ , where  $W$  is the welfare from the solution of the  $\gamma$  problem.*

*(iii) Generically there is a unique first-best profile, which is in pure strategies. Suppose this is the case. Denote the profile in which all types play the first-best by  $\hat{\sigma}$ . Then the solution to the largesse design problem is first-best if and only if  $\gamma \geq g(\hat{\sigma})$ .*

(iv) In a two-player game, at a solution, either a constraint binds or the outcome is the first-best.

### 5.2. Utility Transformations

It is useful to know when we can transform payoffs without changing the solution to the problem. The next result is fairly obvious, but useful to have stated. Proof is in the Appendix.

**Proposition 5.2.** *Consider the largesse design problem transformed by  $A^i, \beta^i > 0, v^i(s^{-i})$  with transformed utility  $\tilde{u}^i(s^i, s^{-i}) = A^i + \beta^i u^i(s^i, s^{-i}) + v^i(s^{-i})$  and largesse  $\tilde{\gamma}_\tau = \beta^i \gamma_\tau$ . The incentive-compatible set of the transformed problem is the same as the original problem. If  $\beta^i = \beta^j$  and  $v^i(s^{-i}) = 0$ , then the set of solutions in the transformed problem is the same as in the original problem.*

Note the importance of  $\beta^i = \beta^j$  for the solutions to remain the same. Using different multipliers for different players implicitly changes the utility weights on different players, and results in a different social welfare function. Equivalently, this is saying that utility for different players must be measured in compatible units.

### 5.3. Comparative Statics

The constraint set, while non-empty and compact, is not generally convex and the objective function, while continuous, is not generally concave. Despite this, the solution correspondence has strong properties.

Fix the set of players and the spaces of pure strategies  $S^i$ . The largesse design problem is parametrized by the utility vector, any point in  $\mathfrak{R}^{\#S}$ , the type distribution, any point in the cartesian product of type simplices  $\Phi$ , and the largesse vector, any point in  $\mathfrak{R}_+^{\#T}$ . The parameter space is some  $Z \subseteq \mathfrak{R}^{\#S} \times \mathfrak{R}_+^{\#T} \times \Phi$ , defined by linear equalities or inequalities (weak or strict).<sup>3</sup> Say that  $Z$  allows *utility perturbations* if, for  $z = (u, \gamma, \phi) \in Z$ , there is an open neighborhood  $O$  of  $u$ , such that  $(O, \gamma, \phi) \subseteq Z$ . In case the game and largesse are constrained to be symmetric, we require only that there is an open neighborhood of symmetric utility perturbations.

For each  $z \in Z$  let  $F(z) \subseteq \Sigma$  denote the feasible set, that is, the incentive-compatible subset of  $\sigma \in \Sigma$  where  $g(\sigma) \leq \gamma$ . Let  $\hat{F}(z)$  denote the solutions to the largesse design problem, and let  $\hat{W}(z)$  be the corresponding welfare. Let  $\bar{\hat{F}}$  denote

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<sup>3</sup>This assumption can be weakened to assuming that  $Z$  is semi-algebraic.

the mapping of  $\hat{F}$  onto the aggregate strategies  $\bar{\sigma}$  derived from the type strategies  $\sigma$ . This is what can be observed.

In a narrow sense,  $\overline{\hat{F}}(z)$  is what the theory predicts. A theory, however, is at best a good idealization. There is no sense in thinking that in reality parameters fall exactly into a lower-dimensional set. Near a bifurcation, such as  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/4$  in Proposition 4.1, at best, behavior can be described by a probability distribution over some nearby set of parameters. This means that to a good approximation behavior is described by a point in the convex hull of the limit points of nearby parameters.

Specifically, let  $R$  be the space of probability distributions over outcomes  $S$ . Each strategy profiles  $\sigma \in \Sigma$  gives rise to a distribution over outcomes  $\rho(\sigma) \in R$ . The correspondence  $\Phi : Z \rightrightarrows R$  defined by  $\Phi = \rho \circ \hat{F}$  provides an alternative to  $\overline{\hat{F}}$  as a description of the predictions of the theory (in the narrow sense). To capture the idea that at a bifurcation point play may correspond to a nearby value of  $z$ , define the correspondence  $\overline{\Phi}$  as the closure of the graph of  $\Phi$ . To capture the idea that when  $\overline{\Phi}$  has multiple values, play may be given by a probability distribution over those points, define the correspondence  $\hat{\Phi}$  by taking  $\hat{\Phi}(z)$  to be the convex hull of  $\overline{\Phi}(z)$ . Note that this makes sense in the space  $R$  of probability distribution over outcomes. Call  $\hat{\Phi}$  the *behavioral correspondence*. In a broad sense,  $\hat{\Phi}(z)$  is what the theory predicts. I have accordingly drawn the “theoretical predictions,” in Figures 2.1 and 4.1, with vertical segments at the bifurcation points, that is, I have drawn  $\hat{\Phi}$  rather than  $\Phi$ .

A *comprehensive subset* of  $Z$  is the complement of a (relatively) closed, lower-dimensional, semi-algebraic subset of  $Z$ . I will explain the semi-algebraic part below. The proof of part (i) and (ii) are in the Appendix, the proof of parts (iii) and (iv) are in Lemmas below.

**Theorem 5.3.** (i) *The correspondence  $z \rightrightarrows (F(z), \hat{\Phi}(z))$  is upper-hemicontinuous and compact valued, and  $\hat{\Phi}(z)$  is also convex valued.*

(ii) *If  $z^n \rightarrow z$  then  $\lim W(z^n) \leq W(z)$ . (Welfare can jump up but not down.)*

(iii) *The correspondence  $z \rightrightarrows (F(z), \hat{F}(z), \hat{W}(z), \hat{\Phi}(z))$  is continuous (upper and lower) at every point on a comprehensive subset of  $Z$ .*

(iv) *If  $Z$  allows utility perturbations, the correspondence  $z \rightarrow (\overline{\hat{F}}(z), \hat{W}(z), \hat{\Phi}(z))$  is continuous function (a singleton) at every point on a comprehensive subset of  $Z$ .*

I should note that the result in (i) about  $\hat{\Phi}$  is closely related to results by Myerson (1982) and by Dutta, Levine and Modica (2018) on the existence of equilibrium

in a game where several groups each solve the largesse design problem with  $\gamma = 0$ . Dutta, Levine and Modica (2018) offer several interpretations of the function  $\hat{\Phi}$  in that setting. It is important in this context that payoffs are continuous in mixed strategies: this avoids the problem of having to endogenously assign payoffs as in Simon and Zame (1990).

### 5.3.1. Bifurcations

Upper-hemicontinuity of the feasibility correspondence might seem like the end of it: neither  $\hat{F}(z)$  nor  $\hat{W}(z)$  is upper-hemicontinuous. Indeed, take the unitary symmetric case with  $\gamma^1 = \gamma^2 = 0$  and consider the “prisoner’s dilemma game” below in Table 5.1 where  $B < 3$ .

	<i>De</i>	<i>Co</i>
<i>De</i>	0, 0	$B, -1$
<i>Co</i>	$-1, B$	1, 1

Table 5.1: The “Prisoner’s Dilemma Game”

For  $B > 1$  this is indeed a prisoner’s dilemma game,  $F(B) = \hat{F}(B) = \{DeDe\}$ ,  $\hat{W}(B) = 0$ , and there is nothing more to be said. However, when  $B = 1$ , this is a coordination game,  $F(B) = \{DeDe, CoCo\}$ , and both  $\hat{F}(B)$  and  $\hat{W}(B)$  jump to  $CoCo$  and 1 respectively. When  $B < 1$  the feasible set  $F(B)$  has three points,  $\{DeDe, CoCo\}$  and the mixed Nash equilibrium, while  $\hat{F}(B)$  and  $\hat{W}(B)$  remain unchanged. Notice that in the unitary symmetric case, with  $\gamma^1 = \gamma^2 = \bar{\gamma} > 0$ , the same jump occurs, albeit at  $B - 1 = \bar{\gamma}$ .

In contrast to the example of section 4, in this bifurcation, welfare jumps along with behavior. As indicated, I refer to this as a welfare bifurcation. Notice that, like the bifurcation in section 4, the bifurcation is “rare” in the sense that it occurs only on a set of dimension 0, in this case the set  $B = \bar{\gamma} + 1$ . It turns out that the property that bifurcations occur only on lower-dimensional sets is true in general. To understand why, it is important that the utility functions are not only continuous in the parameters and mixed strategies, but are polynomials.

### 5.3.2. Semi-algebraic Geometry

A set defined by polynomial equalities and (strict) inequalities, and the unions of such sets are called semi-algebraic and have strong properties.<sup>4</sup> Coste (2002) is a good reference, and Blume and Zame (1994) provide a good summary. Chief among these properties are that sets defined by polynomial equalities and both weak and strict inequalities are semi-algebraic, and that unions, intersections, complements, boundaries, interiors, and closures of semi-algebraic sets are semi-algebraic. Semi-algebraic sets are a finite union of connected real-analytic manifolds, and the dimension of a semi-algebraic set is the largest dimension of such a manifold. The boundary of a semi-algebraic set has lower dimension than the original set.

A correspondence with a semi-algebraic graph is called semi-algebraic. The values of a semi-algebraic correspondence are semi-algebraic sets. Compositions of semi-algebraic correspondences are semi-algebraic. Semi-algebraic functions satisfy a variation on the implicit function theorem and Sard's theorem, called the Hardt Triviality Theorem.

From this point forward, I am going to assume that the parameter space  $Z$  is semi-algebraic. This implies that the constraint correspondence  $F$  is semi-algebraic. A detailed proof can be found in Blume and Zame (1994), who consider Nash equilibrium, but their proof applies if we replace 0 by  $\gamma^i$  in their constraints. Besides Blume and Zame (1994), a series of papers by Govindan and Wilson, for example, Govindan and Wilson (2009), also use the semi-algebraic properties of incentive constraints to prove results about refinements of Nash equilibrium, such as forward induction and strategic stability.

Write  $W(\sigma, z)$  to make transparent the dependence of welfare on the parameters. In the current setting, consider that the solution correspondence can be written as

$$\sigma \in \hat{F}(z) \iff$$

$$\forall \sigma', ((W(\sigma, z) > W(\sigma', z)) \wedge (W(\sigma, z) = W(\sigma', z))) \vee (\sigma' \in F(z)) \vee (\sigma \in F(z)).$$

This set is not obviously semi-algebraic because it uses the quantifier  $\forall \sigma'$ , but the Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem asserts that this does not matter, that, in fact, a set defined by polynomial equalities and inequalities, logical operations, and quantifiers,

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<sup>4</sup>I am grateful to Klaus Ritzberger for pointing this out to me.

is semi-algebraic, that is, can be defined by (a different set of) polynomial equalities and inequalities without quantifiers. Hence the solution correspondences  $\hat{F}(z), \hat{W}(z)$  are semi-algebraic.

Notice that  $\hat{F}(z)$  is semi-algebraic, even if  $W(\sigma, z)$  is semi-algebraic, rather than a polynomial. This can be seen by introducing additional variables  $w, w'$  in place of the function, and using the definition of  $W(\sigma, z)$  being semi-algebraic, that is,  $(w, \sigma, z) \in \text{graph}(W), (w', \sigma', z) \in \text{graph}(W)$ . In a similar vein, the function  $g_\tau(\sigma)$ , also involving maximization, can be shown to be semi-algebraic.

As  $\Phi = \rho \circ \hat{F}$ , and  $\rho$  is semi-algebraic, a polynomial in fact,  $\Phi$  is semi-algebraic, and the closure of a semi-algebraic set is semi-algebraic, so  $\bar{\Phi}$  is as well. Finally, the map  $\hat{\Phi}$  is also semi-algebraic: this follows from the fact that a convex hull in  $K$  dimensions can be expressed as a convex combination of just  $K + 1$  points.

### 5.3.3. Continuity and Generic Uniqueness

Next I prove part (iii) of theorem 5.3.

**Lemma 5.4.** *The correspondence  $z \rightrightarrows (F(z), \hat{F}(z), \hat{W}(z), \hat{\Phi}(z))$  is continuous (upper and lower) at every point of a comprehensive subset of  $Z$ .*

*Proof.* A lemma in Blume and Zame (1994), shows this to be true for any compact valued semi-algebraic correspondence on a semi-algebraic domain.  $\square$

The striking fact about this result is the lower-hemicontinuity. In general, lower hemicontinuity is very difficult to prove, but, in the semi-algebraic case, it holds generically. I will use this to show that it implies the uniqueness of solutions. Specifically, I now prove part (iv) of theorem 5.3.

**Lemma 5.5.** *If  $Z$  allows utility perturbations, the correspondence  $z \rightarrow (\bar{F}(z), \hat{W}(z), \hat{\Phi}(z))$  is continuous function (a singleton) at every point on a comprehensive subset of  $Z$ .*

This cannot be true in  $\hat{F}$ . Consider the punisher's dilemma game where  $1 > \bar{\gamma} > 1/3$ . Suppose that there are two types with  $\gamma_\tau$  close to  $\bar{\gamma}$ . Since the constraint for player 2 is slack, we are free to shift the burden of punishment slightly between the two types without violating the incentive constraints. Perturbing payoffs, and so forth, a small amount will not change this. In other words, the behavior of a player is generically unique, but behavior of each type need not be.

*Proof.* I first show this for  $\widehat{F}(z)$ . The idea of the proof is to prove that if there are multiple solutions in  $\widehat{F}(z)$  then  $\widehat{F}(z)$  fails to be lower-hemicontinuous. The result then follows from Proposition 5.4. That proposition asserts that at every point of a comprehensive subset  $\hat{Z}$  of  $Z$  the correspondence  $\hat{F}$  is continuous, hence so is  $\widehat{F}$ . I will show that on  $\hat{Z}$  the correspondence  $\widehat{F}$  is single-valued.

Suppose not, so that for some  $z \in \hat{Z}$  it is the case that  $\widehat{F}(z)$  has at least two points,  $\bar{\sigma} \neq \tilde{\sigma}$ . Hence for some player  $i$  and  $\hat{s}^i \in S^i$  it must be that  $\bar{\sigma}^i(\hat{s}^i) > \tilde{\sigma}^i(\hat{s}^i)$ . The key idea is to perturb utility so as not to change the feasible sets, while making  $\hat{s}^i$  more attractive from a welfare point of view, and hence favoring  $\hat{\sigma}$  over  $\bar{\sigma}$ . To this end, define the vector

$$v^j(s) = \begin{cases} n/(n-1) & j \neq i, s^i = \hat{s}^i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

and the sequence  $z^m$  by the perturbed utilities  $u^j(s) + \lambda^m v^j(s)$  where  $\lambda^m > 0$  and  $\lambda^m \rightarrow 0$ . Observe that  $v^j(s)$  depends only on  $s^{-j}$ , so that the feasible sets  $F(z^m) = F(z)$  are constant as shown in Proposition 5.2. The perturbed objective function is  $W(\sigma, z^m) = W(\sigma, z) + \lambda^m \bar{\sigma}^i(\hat{s}^i)$ .

Define the space  $H = \{\bar{\sigma} | \bar{\sigma}^i(\hat{s}^i) \geq \tilde{\sigma}^i(\hat{s}^i)\}$ . Clearly  $H$  is compact and  $\bar{\sigma} \notin H$ . The remainder of the proof shows that  $\widehat{F}(z^m) \subset H$ , which means that lower hemicontinuity fails at  $z, \bar{\sigma}$ .

Suppose that  $\bar{\sigma}^m \in \widehat{F}(z^m)$ . It must be that it arises from  $\sigma^m \in F(z^m) = F(z)$ , and since  $\sigma^m$  maximizes  $W(\sigma, z^m)$  in  $F(z)$  and  $\hat{\sigma} \in F(z)$

$$W(\sigma^m, z) + \lambda^m \bar{\sigma}^m(\hat{s}^i) \geq W(\hat{\sigma}, z) + \lambda^m \bar{\sigma}^m(\hat{s}^i) \geq W(\sigma^m, z) + \lambda^m \bar{\sigma}^m(\hat{s}^i)$$

where the final inequality follows from  $\sigma^m \in F(z)$  and  $\hat{\sigma} \in \widehat{F}(z)$ . Hence  $\lambda^m \bar{\sigma}^m(\hat{s}^i) \geq \lambda^m \bar{\sigma}^m(\hat{s}^i)$  so  $\lambda^m > 0$  implies  $\bar{\sigma}^m \in H$ . Since  $\bar{\sigma} \notin H$  it follows that  $\widehat{F}$  is not lower-hemicontinuous at  $z, \bar{\sigma}$  a contradiction.

The results for  $\widehat{W}(z), \widehat{\Phi}(z)$  follow directly from the fact that each is a continuous function on the image of  $\widehat{F}(z)$ .

Finally, I prove that the result holds even in the case of a symmetric game with symmetric largesse with respect to symmetric utility perturbations. To preserve symmetry, rather than picking a player and a pure strategy that has a higher probability under one solution than the other, pick a pure strategy  $\hat{s}^i$  that has a higher probability

for all players under one common mixed strategy than the other. The perturbation is then that for each player that plays  $\hat{s}^i$  all other players are rewarded with a fixed bonus. The rest of the proof is unchanged.  $\square$

#### 5.4. Compressed Models

The basic idea of this subsection is that heterogeneity in largesse, that is, multiple types and divergence from the unitary largesse model, only matters when largesse is large. If largesse is small then players “should” be playing best responses most of the time, and if they do, the remaining small probability of playing something better can be distributed among different types in proportion to their largesse. This breaks down when players are not playing best responses most of the time - there may be too many players with small largesse who are unable to play non-best responses sufficiently frequently.

For any given model, we can define a unitary model, the *compressed model*, as the model with a single type of each player who has the average largesse  $\bar{\gamma}^i \equiv \sum_{\tau \in T^i} \phi_{\tau} \gamma_{\tau}$ . If  $\sigma$  is incentive-compatible in the original model, then  $\bar{\sigma}$  is clearly incentive-compatible in the compressed model, so that  $\bar{W} \geq W$ . If in fact  $\bar{W} = W$ , I say that the model *compresses*. In this case, if  $\hat{\sigma}$  solves the original problem, then  $\bar{\hat{\sigma}}$  solves the compressed problem, as it is feasible there and gives the maximum possible welfare. In other words, the description of a player’s play, aggregated across types, is the same for the original and compressed models.

As indicated, a model need not compress. Consider, for example, the two-player dictator-like game in which the first player must choose between a utility vector of  $(8, 0)$ , and  $(5, 5)$ . Here, as will be the case when both players are risk averse, the unequal split provides less welfare than the equal split. Suppose that there are two equally likely types of player 1, with largesse 0 and 6, that is, one type is selfish. Then  $\bar{\gamma} = 3$ , so that the solution of the compressed problem is for player 1 to split the endowment with probability 1. However, this is not feasible in the original problem - the selfish player will never split the endowment, and so there is only a fifty percent probability of player 1 splitting the endowment. On the other hand, if the two types have largesse 0 and 3 then the solution of the compressed model with  $\bar{\gamma} = 1.5$  is to split half the time, and this is the same solution as the original model where the selfish players do not split, and the remaining players always do

Which case is relevant? The case where the model fails to compress, as in the

counter-example, or the case where it does compress, as occurs with less largesse? Let  $BR^i(\bar{\sigma})$  denote the set of best responses to  $\bar{\sigma}^{-i}$  by player  $i$ . The next result gives a sufficient condition for a model to compress.

**Proposition 5.6.** *Let  $\hat{\sigma}$  be a solution of the compressed model. Let  $\hat{\gamma}^i \equiv \max_{\tau \in T^i} \gamma_\tau$ . If for each player  $i$  we have*

$$\Sigma^i \equiv \sum_{s^i \notin BR(\hat{\sigma})} \hat{\sigma}^i(s^i) \leq \bar{\gamma}^i / \hat{\gamma}^i \quad (5.1)$$

then  $\hat{\sigma}_\tau^i(s^i) \equiv (\gamma_\tau / \bar{\gamma}) \hat{\sigma}^i$  for  $s^i \notin BR(\bar{\sigma})$  and

$$\hat{\sigma}_\tau^i(s^i) \equiv (1 - (\gamma_\tau / \bar{\gamma}) \Sigma^i) \hat{\sigma}^i(s^i) / \sum_{s^i \in BR(\hat{\sigma})} \hat{\sigma}^i(s^i)$$

for  $s^i \in BR(\bar{\sigma})$  is a solution to the original problem and  $W(\hat{\sigma}) = W(\bar{\sigma})$ . That is, when 5.1 holds, the model compresses.

What this says is that if the solution of the compressed problem has a sufficiently high probability of playing a best response for each player, then it is also a “solution” to the original problem. If the original problem was unitary, then the condition in equation 5.1 is always satisfied. More generally, equation 5.1 can be viewed as establishing the amount of heterogeneity in largesse that is consistent with an original model that has the “same” solution as the unitary model.

As an example, consider the punisher’s dilemma game from section 4. In the range  $\bar{\gamma}$  between 1/4 and 1/3 the largest probability of not playing a best response is by player 1, and is  $\sigma_C^1 = \bar{\gamma} / (1 - 2\bar{\gamma})$ . Suppose there are two types, with the same distribution for both players, a selfish type with largesse 0, and an ethical type  $\tau = E$  with probability  $\phi_E$  and largesse  $\bar{\gamma} / \phi_E$ . Then from Proposition 5.6 the solution for the compressed problem is valid for the two type problem, provided  $\bar{\gamma} / \phi_E \leq \bar{\gamma} / (1 - 2\bar{\gamma})$ , or, equivalently,  $\phi_E \geq 1 - 2\bar{\gamma}$ . At the bifurcation point,  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/4$ , this is  $\phi_E \geq 1/2$ , and at  $\bar{\gamma} = 1/3$ ,  $\phi_E \geq 2/3$ .

*Proof.* Since  $W(\hat{\sigma}) \leq W(\bar{\sigma})$  it suffices to prove that  $\hat{\sigma}$  is feasible in the original problem.

First, observe that  $\bar{\sigma} = \hat{\sigma}$ . For  $s^i \notin BR^i(\bar{\sigma})$  we have  $\bar{\sigma}^i(s^i) = \sum_{\tau \in T^i} \phi_\tau (\gamma_\tau / \bar{\gamma}^i) \hat{\sigma}^i(s^i) =$

$\hat{\sigma}^i(s^i)$ . For  $s^i \in BR(\bar{\sigma})$  we have

$$\bar{\sigma}^i(s^i) = \sum_{\tau \in T^i} \phi_\tau (1 - (\gamma_\tau/\bar{\gamma}^i)\Sigma^i) \hat{\sigma}^i(s^i) / \sum_{s^i \in BR(\hat{\sigma})} \hat{\sigma}^i(s^i) = \hat{\sigma}^i(s^i).$$

The incentive constraints are always satisfied for  $\sigma^i \in BR^i(\bar{\sigma})$  so in the original problem the incentive constraints are

$$\sum_{s^i \notin BR(\hat{\sigma})} \left( \max_{s^i \in S^i} u^i(s^i, \bar{\sigma}^{-i}) - u^i((\gamma_\tau/\bar{\gamma}^i)\hat{\sigma}^i(s^i), \bar{\sigma}^{-i}) \right) \leq \gamma_\tau,$$

which are satisfied, since the constraints are satisfied in the compressed model.

The crucial step is to check that  $\hat{\sigma}_\tau^i$  is actually a probability distribution, that is,  $(\gamma_\tau/\bar{\gamma}^i)\Sigma^i \leq 1$ . Writing out

$$(\gamma_\tau/\bar{\gamma}^i)\Sigma^i = (\gamma_\tau/\bar{\gamma}) \sum_{s^i \notin BR(\hat{\sigma})} \hat{\sigma}^i(s^i) \leq (\hat{\gamma}^i/\bar{\gamma}^i) \sum_{s^i \notin BR(\hat{\sigma})} \hat{\sigma}^i(s^i).$$

By the assumption, equation 5.1, this final expression is less than or equal to one.  $\square$

It is tempting to think that when  $\gamma$  is small, a best response must be played with high probability. Because of mixing this might not be the case, but when the solution for  $\gamma = 0$  is unique and a strict Nash equilibrium, if we bound the ratios of the  $\gamma_\tau$ 's, then, indeed, the model compresses.

**Proposition 5.7.** *Suppose that  $z \in Z^B$  are such that  $\bar{\gamma}^i/\hat{\gamma}^i \geq B$  or  $\gamma = 0$ . Suppose  $\hat{z} \in Z^B$  is such that  $\hat{\gamma} = 0$  and that the corresponding solution to the largesse design problem is unique and is a strict Nash equilibrium  $\hat{\sigma}$ . Then there is a neighborhood of  $\hat{z}$  in  $Z^B$  in which the model compresses.*

In particular, if we fix the payoffs, the types distribution and  $\gamma$ , and consider models  $\lambda\gamma$  where  $\lambda$  is a positive scalar constant, and the solution to the largesse design problem with  $\lambda = 0$  is unique and a strict Nash equilibrium, then, for small enough  $\lambda$ , the model compresses.

*Proof.* Suppose there is a sequence  $z^m \in Z^B$ ,  $z^m \rightarrow \hat{z}$  such that the model does not compress. In particular, by Proposition 5.6 and the definition of  $Z^B$ , there is a  $\hat{\sigma}^m \in \hat{F}(z^m)$ , with  $\max_i \sum_{s^i \notin BR^i(\hat{\sigma}^m)} \hat{\sigma}^i(s^i) > B$ . Assume, without loss of generality,

that  $\hat{\sigma}^m \rightarrow \tilde{\sigma}$ . If  $\tilde{\sigma} = \hat{\sigma}$  then  $\max_i \sum_{s^i \notin BR^i(\hat{\sigma}^m)} \hat{\sigma}(s^{im}) \rightarrow 0$ , since  $\hat{\sigma}$  is strict. Hence,  $\tilde{\sigma} \neq \hat{\sigma}$ .

Since the solution to the largesse design problem at  $\hat{z}$  is assumed to be unique, we conclude that  $W(\tilde{\sigma}) < W(\hat{\sigma})$ . However, at  $\hat{\gamma} = 0$ ,  $\hat{\sigma}$  strictly satisfies the incentive constraints, so is feasible for all nearby  $z$ . Hence,  $W(\hat{\sigma}^m, z^m) \geq W(\hat{\sigma}, \hat{z}^m)$ , and by continuity of  $W$ , this implies  $W(\tilde{\sigma}) \geq W(\hat{\sigma})$ . This contradiction concludes the proof.  $\square$

## 6. Public Goods

I now study a public goods game with punishment and unitary largesse. In  $2 \times 2$  games there is no issue about where to spend largesse, but only how much can be achieved by spending it. The public goods game I study is a  $3 \times 3$  game, in which a decision has to be made on which of the two sub-optimal actions the largesse should be used for. Specifically, I consider a symmetric game, in which players can choose to free ride, *Fr*, contribute to a public good, *Co*, or both contribute to the public good and punish free riders, *Pu*. Denote by  $\sigma_P^1, \sigma_C^1$  the probabilities of *Pu* and *Co*, respectively. I make the obvious symmetry assumption that  $\gamma^1 = \gamma^2 = \bar{\gamma}$ .

Contributing to the public good has a cost of  $v + c$  where  $v > c > 0$ , while contribute to the public good and punishing free riders has a higher cost,  $v + c + d$ , where  $d > 0$ . You can think of  $d$  as a simplified model of costs that arise from trembling.

The public good, if produced, is worth  $v$  to each player. This is additive, so if both produce the public good, each gets  $2v$  from public good output. If a free rider is punished, the free rider suffers a cost of  $p > c$ , so that, if the opponent is punishing, it is better to contribute than to free ride. To avoid an uninteresting case, I assume also that  $p > d$ .

### 6.1. Dominance Solvability

Suppose that  $\gamma = 0$ . Then *Co* strictly dominates *Pu*. Once *Pu* is eliminated, *Fr* strictly dominates *Co*. Hence *FrFr* is the unique solution of iterated strict dominance.

In the laboratory, what is seen is that in fact free riders are sometimes punished. Once again, the usual interpretation is that this is some sort of fairness or reciprocity. Fairness says free riding is unfair, and fairness can be restored through punishment.

Reciprocity says that free riding is an unkind act and should be reciprocated by punishment.

By contrast, largesse design says that punishment is an effective way to provide incentives for socially desirable contributions.

### 6.2. Overview of the Solution

The big picture is that at  $\bar{\gamma} = 0$  there are only free-riders. As  $\bar{\gamma}$  is increased from zero, initially some free riders use their largesse to produce, and welfare increases linearly. If the cost of punishment is low in the sense that  $d/(p-d) < (v-c)/c$  then there is a bifurcation, a value of  $\bar{\gamma} = (d/p)c$ , where a new type of equilibrium is possible. In this equilibrium there are no free-riders, but punishers provide the incentives for production, and largesse is used to compensate punishers for the cost of punishment. Welfare jumps up discontinuously.

Bifurcation, the emergence of a new type of equilibrium, is a key feature of models like this. There are two ways in which largesse can be “spent.” It can be used directly to compensate for the cost of production or it can be used indirectly to compensate for providing incentives for others. Once enough largesse is available, if the cost of punishment is not too high, it is better to compensate for providing incentives.

As largesse is increased further, past the bifurcation point, less incentive is needed for producers, and the number of punishers falls, the number of producers increases, and welfare increases, until, when there is enough largesse,  $\bar{\gamma} = c$ , the first-best of  $v-c$  is attained, and production  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$ , takes place entirely out of kindness.

### 6.3. Solution of the Largesse Design Problem

**Proposition 6.1.** *There is a comprehensive set consisting of three different regions with qualitatively different solutions:*

i. if  $\bar{\gamma} < c$  and either  $\bar{\gamma} < dc/p$  or  $d/(p-d) \geq (v-c)/c$  then  $\sigma_P^1 = 0$ ,  $\sigma_C^2 = \bar{\gamma}/c$ , and welfare

$$W = (\bar{\gamma}/c)(v-c).$$

ii. if  $dc/p \leq \bar{\gamma} < c$  and  $d/(p-d) \leq (v-c)/c$  then  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1 = 1$  (no free riders),

$$\sigma_P^1 = \frac{c - \bar{\gamma}}{p - d},$$

and welfare

$$W = (v - c) - \frac{c - \bar{\gamma}}{p - d}d.$$

iii. if  $\bar{\gamma} \geq c$  then  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$  and the solution is first-best with welfare  $W = v - c$ .

In particular, if  $d/(p - d) < (v - c)/c$  welfare jumps up at  $\bar{\gamma} = dc/p$ , that is, there is a welfare bifurcation. At this point the feasible set has a discrete increase in size because it becomes possible to coerce all the free-riders into contributing. With a low cost of punishment,  $d/(p - d) < (v - c)/c$ , it is desirable to do so.

*Proof.* As usual, it is useful to dispose of the large largesse, first-best, case (iii) first. Notice that there is only one constraint.

If  $\bar{\gamma} < c$  then in the solution the constraint must bind and  $\sigma_C^1 < 1$ , while if  $\bar{\gamma} \geq c$  then the solution of the largesse design problem is  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$ .

Suppose that the constraint does not bind. In this case shifting a small amount of weight to  $C$  increases welfare without violating the constraint. If  $\bar{\gamma} < c$  and the constraint does not bind then  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$ . This implies that the best response is  $F$ , with a gain of  $c$  over  $C$ . Hence, if  $\bar{\gamma} < c$ , the incentive constraint is violated. On the other hand, if  $\bar{\gamma} \geq c$  then  $\sigma_C^1 = 1$  satisfies the incentive constraint, and, as this is the unique first-best, it must be the solution.

We may now assume that  $\bar{\gamma} < c$  and that the constraint binds with  $\sigma_C^1 < 1$ . Since  $P$  is never a best response, this implies that the best response is  $F$ . Observe that  $c$  and  $c + d$  is what is lost by  $C$  and  $P$ , respectively, compared to  $F$ , if there is no punishment, but that both avoid the punishment cost of  $\sigma_P^1 p$ . Hence, the incentive constraint holding with equality is

$$(\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1)c + \sigma_P^1 d - (\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1)\sigma_P^1 p = \bar{\gamma}.$$

The expected social surplus from output of the public good is  $\sigma_C^1(v - c) + \sigma_P^1(v - c - d)$ , while the expected cost of punishment is  $(1 - \sigma_C^1 - \sigma_P^1)\sigma_P^1 p$ , so welfare is given by

$$W = (\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1)(v - c) - \sigma_P^1 d - (1 - \sigma_C^1 - \sigma_P^1)\sigma_P^1 p.$$

The incentive constraint can be rewritten in the convenient form

$$(\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1 - d/p)(c - \sigma_P^1 p) = \bar{\gamma} - dc/p. \quad (6.1)$$

This highlights the semi-algebraic nature of the constraint discussed in Section 5.1. In particular, the constraint has two distinctly different shapes, depending on whether  $c - \sigma_P^1 p = 0$  or not. If  $c - \sigma_P^1 p = 0$  then it must be that  $\bar{\gamma} = dc/p$ , so this is a candidate for a bifurcation point.

Suppose that  $c - \sigma_P^1 p = 0$ . Then  $\sigma_P^1 = c/p$  and  $\bar{\gamma} = dc/p$ . In this case any  $\sigma_P^1 \leq \sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1 \leq 1$  is feasible. In other words, when  $\bar{\gamma} = dc/p$ , in  $(\sigma_P^1, \sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1)$  space, the constraint has a vertical segment at  $\sigma_P^1 = c/p$ . Increasing  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1$  holding fixed  $\sigma_P^1$  preserves the incentive constraint while reducing the number of free-riders: this unambiguously increases welfare, so it must be in this case that  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1 = 1$ . Welfare is  $v - c - dc/p$ . The possible optimality of other values of  $\sigma_P^1$  when  $\bar{\gamma} = dc/p$  are checked below.

Suppose that  $c - \sigma_P^1 p \neq 0$ . If  $\sigma_P^1 > c/p$  then  $C$  is a best response, which is already ruled out, so it must be that  $\sigma_P^1 < c/p$ . This gives the solution of the incentive constraint 6.1

$$\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1 - d/p = \frac{\bar{\gamma} - dc/p}{c - \sigma_P^1 p}.$$

Here, since the denominator on the left is strictly positive, there is no vertical segment, and the upper boundary of the feasible set is a continuous function.

If  $\bar{\gamma} < dc/p$  then  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1$  is a decreasing function of  $\sigma_P^1$ , meaning that as players shift from  $C$  to  $P$ , the number of free-riders actually increases, so this is unambiguously bad for welfare. Hence  $\sigma_P^1 = 0$  and solving the incentive constraint gives  $\sigma_C^1 = \bar{\gamma}/c$ .

The nature of the bifurcation is this: for  $\bar{\gamma} < dc/p$ , the constraint implies that  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1 \leq \bar{\gamma}/c < d/p < 1$ . By contrast, at the bifurcation point,  $\bar{\gamma} = dc/p$ ,  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1$  can be as large as 1. In other words, when the bifurcation point is reached, there is an upward jump in the possible values of  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1$ . It leads to the possibility that there can be an upward jump in welfare, and in fact, for  $d/(p-d) < (v-c)/c$ , this is indeed the case. This discrete increase in the feasible set illustrates one of the subtleties of semi-algebraic geometry.

Turning to larger  $\bar{\gamma}$ 's, that is,  $\bar{\gamma} \geq dc/p$ ,  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1$  is a non-decreasing function of  $\sigma_P^1$ . Plug the solution of the incentive constraint into the objective function to find

$$W = \frac{\bar{\gamma} - \sigma_P^1 d}{c - \sigma_P^1 p} v - \gamma - \sigma_P^1 p.$$

The first derivative is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dW}{d\sigma_P^1} &= \left( \frac{-d(c - \sigma_P^1 p)}{(c - \sigma_P^1 p)^2} + \frac{(\bar{\gamma} - \sigma_P^1 d)p}{(c - \sigma_P^1 p)^2} \right) v - p \\ &= \left( \frac{\bar{\gamma}p - dc}{(c - \sigma_P^1 p)^2} \right) v - p \end{aligned}$$

The second derivative is

$$\frac{d^2W}{d(\sigma_P^1)^2} = 2 \left( \frac{\bar{\gamma}p - dc}{(c - \sigma_P^1 p)^3} \right) pv.$$

Since  $\bar{\gamma} \geq dc/p$  and  $c - \sigma_P^1 p < 0$ , the function is weakly convex. Hence, the endpoints must be checked to see where the welfare maximum is.

Since  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1$  is an non-decreasing function of  $\sigma_P^1$  the endpoints are where  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1 = 1$ , and where  $\sigma_P^1 = 0$ . In the former case

$$\sigma_P^1 = \frac{c - \bar{\gamma}}{p - d},$$

and in the latter  $\sigma_C^1 + \sigma_P^1 = \bar{\gamma}/c$ . Plugging into welfare gives

$$W_P = (v - c) - \frac{c - \bar{\gamma}}{p - d}d$$

in the former case and

$$W_C = (\bar{\gamma}/c)(v - c).$$

in the latter. The condition  $W_P > W_C$  can be written as

$$\frac{d}{p - d} < \frac{v - c}{c},$$

meaning the cost of punishment relative to the size of punishment is not too great.  $\square$

## 7. Leveraging Reputation

The setting I use for analyzing reputation is based on a simplified and perturbed version of the trust game studied by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), a  $2 \times 2$  game with the payoff matrix given below in Table 7.1.

	<i>Se</i>	<i>Re</i>
<i>Ke</i>	10, 0	10, 0
<i>In</i>	0, 30	15, 16

Table 7.1: The Reward Game

The interpretation is this. The first player has an endowment of 10. They may either *Ke*(ep) their endowment or *In*(vest) it with player 2. If they keep the endowment they consume it and player 2 gets nothing. If they invest, player 2 may either elect to *Re*(ciprocate) by returning 15 at a cost of 14 or *Se*(lfishly) keep the entire investment which has a value to them of 30.

Notice that player 2 would like to commit to *Re* to force the first-best outcome *InRe*. Commitment also plays a crucial role in reputational models. That is, while, in a sense, the goal of these models is to show how reputation can substitute for commitment, underlying it is a small probability that some players are actually committed. This low probability of commitment is then bootstrapped to show that non-committed players nevertheless act committed to keep a good reputation. In the context of largesse design, players can commit, but they can incur only limited losses from doing so. My goal here is to explain how a few committed players with limited and possibly very small largesse can act like “behavioral types” in reputational models to provide good solutions to the largesse design problem. Specifically, I want to examine what happens when a game is played  $T$  times between a patient player 2 who receives the time-average payoff, and a sequence of short-run player 1’s. I assume that every player 1 has the same distribution of largesse.

I will limit attention to a special class of games, capturing the key elements of the trust game, in table 7.1. In a two-person game, define the joint Stackelberg payoff,  $W^S$ , as the highest welfare attainable when player 1 plays a best response to player 2. I assume that there is a unique pure strategy for player 2,  $\hat{s}^2$ , that solves this problem. I assume also that there is a unique Nash equilibrium, it is in pure strategies,  $\tilde{s}$ , and that it provides less welfare than  $W^S$ . I refer to such a game as a *simple reputation* game.

**Proposition 7.1.** *Fix any largesse distribution in a simple reputation game, such that for some  $\tau$  both  $\phi_\tau^2 > 0$  and  $\gamma_\tau^2 > 0$ . Then  $\liminf_{T \rightarrow \infty} W_T \geq W^S$ .*

*Proof.* By Proposition 5.1 (ii) it suffices to prove this in the special case where player 1 is selfish and player 2 is either type  $\tau$  or selfish. That is, there is a single type of

player 1 with  $\gamma^1 = 0$  and two types of player 2, one with  $\phi_\tau^2, \gamma_\tau^2$  and the other with  $\phi_\sigma^2 = (1 - \phi_\tau^2), \gamma_\sigma^2 = 0$ .

Rather than trying to compute the solution to the largesse design problem, I use the technique developed Fudenberg and Levine (1989) for analyzing reputational models to get a lower bound on welfare. This is done by showing that type  $\tau$  can find a largesse feasible strategy that gives nearly  $W^S$  welfare, when the selfish players all best respond. The idea is similar to that used in the reputational literature, that is, type  $\tau$  (with high probability) forever plays the “Stackelberg” action of  $\hat{s}^2$ . From Fudenberg and Levine (1989) this implies  $\liminf_{T \rightarrow \infty} W_T \geq W^S$ . However, it is necessary to show that this strategy also satisfies the largesse constraint. This requires an upper as well as the usual lower bound on the payoffs of the “rational type,” here the selfish type of player 2.

As indicated, type  $\tau$  with high probability plays  $\hat{s}^2$  always. In addition, however, with positive probability type  $\tau$  also plays each strategy of the form, play  $\hat{s}^2$  until  $t$  then play  $\tilde{s}^2$ . The latter part of type  $\tau$ 's strategy makes it easy to get an upper bound on the payoff of the selfish type of player 2. Specifically, it forces the short-run players, after observing  $\tilde{s}^2$ , to conclude either that they face a selfish type or a type committed to subsequently playing  $\tilde{s}^2$ . Hence, it is a Nash equilibrium for the selfish player always to play  $\tilde{s}^2$  and the short-run player always to play  $\tilde{s}^1$ , after observing  $\tilde{s}^2$ . With this short-run player strategy, the selfish type of player 2 must play  $\hat{s}^2$ , except, possibly, for some fixed number of periods near the end of the game, where they switch to  $\tilde{s}^2$ .

Since payoff is time-average, the loss to type  $\tau$  playing  $\hat{s}^2$  during the final periods goes to zero as  $T \rightarrow \infty$ , so the largesse constraint will be satisfied.  $\square$

I want to emphasize that the *ex ante* nature of the largesse constraint is here again crucial. That is, type  $\tau$  of player 2 has a limited amount of largesse, but they can spend it in whatever periods they choose. Hence, they are free to lose in a few periods, provided they do not lose in too many. This is closely connected to way in which Radner (1980) exploits  $\epsilon$ -equilibrium to generate cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game.

## 8. The Generalized Largesse Design Problem

The largesse design problem is the rule utilitarian analog of the act utilitarian warm glow of giving, such as in Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997), in which there is a constraint on how much individuals are willing to give. There is a second act utilitarian model, which is the standard altruism model, such as in Ledyard (1995), in which individual utility is a weighted average of own direct utility, and social welfare. In particular, the warm glow of giving model that underlies the largesse design problem, says that an individual is willing to contribute largesse, even if it raises social welfare very little. However, some individuals might be willing to contribute largesse only if the gain in social welfare is sufficiently large. Putting it another way, if largesse increases social welfare, then the benefit to others exceed the cost to the self, but if that increase in benefit to others exceeds the cost to the self only by a very small amount and the cost to self is very high, the individual might be unwilling to make the contribution.

Recall that  $g_\tau(\sigma)$  is the largesse contribution by type  $\tau$  at  $\sigma$ . Altruism considerations suggest that, in addition to the largesse constraint  $g_\tau(\sigma) \leq \gamma_\tau$ , type  $\tau$  might also have a largesse utility cost,  $\kappa_\tau(g_\tau(\sigma))$ , which is non-negative, non-decreasing, and semi-algebraic, with  $\kappa_\tau(0) = 0$ . The most interesting and obvious case, since  $g_\tau(\sigma)$  is already in utility units, is the case of constant marginal cost,  $\kappa_\tau(g) = \lambda_\tau g$  where  $\lambda_\tau \geq 0$ . However, there are other possibilities, such as  $\kappa_\tau(g) = \lambda_\tau g^{\alpha_\tau}$ , where  $\alpha_\tau$  is a rational number.

A simple parsimonious rule utilitarian model that incorporates a utility cost of largesse, is to recognize that this is a social cost, and so incorporate it directly into welfare. In other words, define welfare for the *generalized largesse design problem* as

$$W(\sigma) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n u^i(\bar{\sigma})/n - \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\tau \in T^i} \phi_\tau \kappa_\tau(g_\tau(\sigma))/n,$$

with the constraints remaining unchanged. Notice that it is no longer the case that welfare depends only on  $\bar{\sigma}$  since  $g_\tau(\sigma)$  depends on  $\sigma_\tau$ .

To understand what this means, fix a player  $j$  and type  $t$  of that player, and write welfare as

$$nW(\sigma) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\tau \in T^i, \tau \neq t} \phi_\tau (u^i(\sigma_\tau^i, \bar{\sigma}^{-i}) - \kappa_\tau(g_\tau(\sigma)))$$

$$+\phi_t (u^j(\sigma_t^j, \bar{\sigma}^{-j}) - \kappa_t(g_t(\sigma))).$$

Observe that  $\phi_t$  is the probability that type  $t$  gets to play. Hence, the first term is the welfare of others, and the second term is the expected utility of type  $t$ . This says that if a (feasible) change in  $\sigma_t^j$  increases the (total, not average) welfare of others by one unit, it will only improve the objective function for the generalized largesse design problem if the expected utility cost to  $t$  of making the contribution is less than one. In original case  $\kappa_t(g) = 0$ , this just says that the benefit to others must exceed the expected utility loss. In the linear case  $\kappa_t(g) = \lambda_t(g)$  we have the expected utility of type  $t$  equal to

$$\phi_t (u^j(\sigma_t^j, \bar{\sigma}^{-j}) - \kappa_t(g_t(\sigma))) = \phi_t \left( (1 + \lambda_t)u^j(\sigma_t^j, \bar{\sigma}^{-j}) - \lambda_t \max_{s^i \in S^i} u^j(s^j, \bar{\sigma}^{-j}) \right).$$

Note that  $\max_{s^i \in S^i} u^j(s^j, \bar{\sigma}^{-j})$  does not depend on  $\sigma_t^j$ . Hence, this says that the benefit to others must exceed the utility loss by a factor of  $1 + \lambda_t$ . More broadly, the generalized largesse design problems captures the idea that  $t$  will not contribute if the benefit is too small relative to the cost.

The key conclusion is that the main theorem, theorem 5.3, remains true for the generalized largesse design problem: the fact that  $W(\sigma)$  depends only on  $\bar{\sigma}$  is not used in the proof, which remains line for line unchanged. One additional bit of explanation is helpful, however. The expression for the perturbed utility function in the proof of 5.5 is correct because the utility perturbation does not change  $g_\tau(\sigma)$ , hence does not change  $\kappa_\tau(g_\tau(\sigma))$ .

## 9. Conclusion

The largesse design problem is economically relevant, but involves maximizing a function that may not be concave over a set that need not be convex, and which need not be lower-hemicontinuous in parameters. Despite this, solutions exist and are well-behaved, generically being single-valued and continuous. In simple examples, it is not difficult to characterize solution sets analytically.

From an economic perspective, what these examples show, is that largesse design is about being opportunistic. It is about using low-cost punishments, rewards, and reputation, to encourage other players to pro-social behavior, rather than blindly

acting in a pro-social way. For explaining non-selfish behavior inside and outside the laboratory, the theory of largesse design provides a sensible and tractable alternative to psychological theories of preferences.

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### Appendix: Proofs not in the Text

For ease of reading, I restate the result that is to be proven.

**Proposition 9.1.** *(Proposition 5.1 in the text) (i) The incentive-compatible set is compact and non-empty. A solution to the largesse design problem exists, and the set of solutions is compact.*

*(ii) For a fixed normal form game and the distribution of types, and suppose that  $\gamma' \geq \gamma$ . Then the welfare  $W'$  from the solution of the  $\gamma'$  problem satisfies  $W' \geq W$ , where  $W$  is the welfare from the solution of the  $\gamma$  problem.*

*(iii) Generically there is a unique first-best profile, which is in pure strategies. Denote the profile in which all types play the first-best by  $\hat{\sigma}$ . Then the solution to the largesse design problem is first-best if and only if  $\gamma \geq g(\hat{\sigma})$ .*

*(iv) In a two-player game either a constraint binds or the outcome is the first-best.*

*Proof.* (i) The incentive-compatible set is non-empty because it contains all Nash equilibria, and is closed because it is defined by continuous functions and weak inequalities. It is bounded because it lies in the simplex. The objective function is continuous. Hence there is a maximum, and the argmax set is compact.

(ii) The solution of the  $\gamma'$  problem is feasible in the  $\gamma$  problem.

(iii) Generically each pure profile has a different level of welfare, so there is a unique welfare-maximizing pure strategy. This is welfare-maximizing also over mixed strategies, since mixed strategies induce a probability distribution over the entire profile space. Clear then, the first-best is attainable if and only if  $\hat{\sigma}$  is incentive-compatible.

(iv) If no constraint binds then the outcome must be an interior local welfare maximum. Since the objective function is quadratic, an interior local maximum is a global maximum.  $\square$

**Proposition 9.2.** *(Proposition 5.2 in the text) Consider the largesse design problem transformed by  $A^i, \beta^i > 0, v^i(s^{-i})$  with transformed utility  $\tilde{u}^i(s^i, s^{-i}) = A^i + \beta^i u^i(s^i, s^{-i}) + v^i(s^{-i})$  and largesse  $\tilde{\gamma}_\tau = \beta^i \gamma_\tau$ . The incentive-compatible set of the transformed problem is the same as the original problem. If  $\beta^i = \beta^j$  and  $v^i(s^{-i}) = 0$ , then the set of solutions in the transformed problem is that same as in the original problem.*

*Proof.* The transformed incentive constraints are

$$A^i + \beta^i u^i(\sigma_\tau^i, \tilde{\sigma}^{-i}) + \beta^i \gamma_\tau \geq A^i + \beta^i u^i(s^i, \tilde{\sigma}^{-i})$$

which is equivalent to the original. When  $\beta^i = \beta^j$  and  $v^i(s^{-i}) = 0$  the transformed objective function is

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\tau \in T^i} \phi_\tau(A^i + \beta u(\sigma_\tau^i, \tilde{\sigma}^{-i}))/n = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\tau \in T^i} \phi_\tau A^i/n + \beta W(\sigma)$$

equivalent to the original. □

**Proposition 9.3.** *(parts (i) and (ii) of Theorem 5.3 in the text) (i) The correspondence  $z \Rightarrow (F(z), \hat{\Phi}(z))$  is upper-hemicontinuous and compact valued, and  $\hat{\Phi}(z)$  is also convex valued.*

*(ii) If  $z^n \rightarrow z$  then  $\lim W(z^n) \leq W(z)$ . (Welfare can jump up but not down.)*

*Proof.* For (i), and  $F(z)$ , it is compact valued by Proposition 5.1, and upper-hemicontinuous because it is defined by weak inequalities and continuous functions.

For (i) and  $\hat{\Phi}(z)$ , the correspondence  $\bar{\Phi}$  is upper-hemicontinuous and compact valued because it has a closed graph and  $R$  is compact. The correspondence  $\hat{\Phi}$  is convex valued by construction and compact valued since the convex hull of a compact set is compact.

Suppose that  $\hat{\Phi}$  fails to be upper-hemicontinuous. Suppose  $z^m \rightarrow z$  and  $r^m \in \hat{\Phi}(z^m)$  with  $r^m \rightarrow r$ . Then there is a probability measure  $\mu^m$  with support  $\bar{\Phi}(z^m)$  such that  $r^m = \int \tilde{r} \mu^m(d\tilde{r})$  and, since  $R$  is compact, for a weakly convergent subsequence,  $\mu^m \rightarrow \mu$ . So  $r = \int \tilde{r} \mu(d\tilde{r})$ . Let  $U = R \setminus \bar{\Phi}(z)$ . Since  $\hat{\Phi}$  fails to be upper-hemicontinuous it must be that  $\mu(U) > 0$ , that is, the support of  $\mu$  is larger than  $\bar{\Phi}(z)$ .

Since  $\bar{\Phi}(z)$  is compact,  $U$  is open. Hence  $\liminf_m \mu^m(U) \geq \mu(U)$ . Moreover, since  $R$  is a compact subset of a finite-dimensional space, the measure  $\mu$  is regular, and in particular inner regular, so that there is a compact set  $K \subset U$  such that  $\mu(K) > \mu(U)/2$ . Hence, on a properly chosen subsequence, we have  $\mu^m(K) \geq \mu(U)/4 > 0$ . Since  $\mu^m(K) > 0$ , there is a  $\tilde{r}^m \in K \cap \bar{\Phi}(z^m)$ , and we may assume this converges to some  $\tilde{r}$ . But then  $\tilde{r} \in K$  and  $K \cap \bar{\Phi}(z) = \emptyset$  contradicting the upper-hemicontinuity of  $\bar{\Phi}$ . Hence  $\mu(U) = 0$ . This contradiction shows that  $\hat{\Phi}$  is in fact upper-hemicontinuous.

For (ii) Let  $\hat{\sigma}^n \in \hat{F}(z^n)$  be a convergent subsequence. By part (i)  $\tilde{\sigma} = \lim \hat{\sigma}^n \in$

$F(z)$ . Hence, since the objective function is continuous,  $\lim W(z^n) = \lim W(\hat{\sigma}^n, z^n) = W(\tilde{\sigma}, z) \leq W(z)$ .  $\square$