link to class schedule
link to textbook
link to perilous populism website

1. Overview  old introduction

Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2012): Why Nations Fail, Crown Business.
Besley, T. and T. Persson (2007), "The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics"
Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (1997): "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?"
Ehrlick, I. and F. Lui (2000): "Bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth," Journal of Political Economy
Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2004): "Do Institutions Cause Growth" Journal of economic Growth 9: 271-303.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001): "Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution," No. w8460. National bureau of economic research.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2000): "The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation," No. w7771. National bureau of economic research.
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman (1994): "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review 84: 833-850.

2. Political Contests

Hillman, A. L. and J. G. Riley (1989) "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers" Economics and Politics
Che, Yeon-Koo, and Ian L. Gale (1998): "Caps on political lobbying," American Economic Review 88: 643-651.

3. Enforcement in Groups old slides

Levine, David K., and Salvatore Modica (2013): "Peer Discipline Incentives Within Groups"
Kandori, Michihiro (1992): "Social norms and community enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies
Shapiro, Carl and Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1984): "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device", American Economic Review 74: 433-444
Border, Kim C. and Joel Sobel (1987): "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder", The Review of Economic Studies Vol. 54, pp. 525-540
Di Porto, Edoardo, Nicola Persico and Nicolas Sahuguet (2013): "Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing", American Economic Journal: Micro
Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1999): "Political economy, information and incentives," European Economic Review.
Ostrom, Elinor (1990): Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker and Roy Gardner (1992): "Covenants with and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible", The American Political Science Review (86)
Banks, Jeffrey S. and Barry R. Weingast (1992): "The political control of bureaucracies under asymmetric information," American Journal of Political Science

4. Lobbying and Group Size Lobbying versus Voting  Winner versus Loser

Becker, G. S. (1983): "A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371-400.
Acemoglu, Daron (2001): "Inefficient redistribution", American Political Science Review 95: 649-661.
Esteban, J. and D. Ray (2001): "Collective action and the group size paradox," American Political Science Association 3: 663-672.
Ades, A. and R. DiTella (2002): "The new economics of corruption: a survey and some new results," Political Studies.
Dixit, Avinash (2004): Lawlessness and Economics, Princeton University Press
Austen-Smith, David and J. R. Wright (1992): "Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote," Social Choice and Welfare.
Becker, Gary S. (1985): "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs", Journal of Public Economics.
Becker, Gary S. and Casey B. Mulligan (1998): "Deadweight costs and the size of government," NBER.
Becker, Gary S. (1986): "The Public Interest Hypothesis Revisited: A New Test of Peltzman's Theory of Regulation", Public Choice 49: 223-234.
Boadway, R. and M. Keen (2000): "Redistribution," Handbook of income Distribution.
Damania, R., P. G. Frederiksson and M. Mani (2004): "The persistence of corruption and regulatory compliance failures: Theory and evidence," Public Choice.
Slinko, Irina, Evgeny Yakovlev, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2005), "Laws for sale: evidence from Russia," American Law and Economics Review 7.1: 284-318.
Levine, D. K. and S. Modica [2016]: "Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations"

5. Lobbying versus Cartels

6. Voter Turnout

Palfrey, T. and H. Rosenthal [1985]: "Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty," American Political Science Review
Levine, D. K. and T. R. Palfrey [2007]: "The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study," American Political Science Review, 101: 143-158
Feddersen, T. J. and A.Sandroni [2006]: "A theory of participation in elections," American Economic Review
Coate, S. and M. Conline (2004): "A group rule: Utilitarian approach to voter turnout: Theory and evidence" AER
Coate, S., M. Conlin and A. Moro (2008): "The performance of pivotal-voter models in small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas liquor referenda" Journal of Public Economics
TJ Feddersen, T. J. and W. Pesendorfer (1996): "The swing voter's curse," American economic review
Levine, D. K. and A. Mattozzi [2015]: "Voter Participation with Collusive Parties"

7. Games Between Collusive Groups

Dutta, R., D. K. Levine and S. Modica (2016): "Collusion Constrained Equilibrium"
Olson, Mancur (1965): The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Esteban, J. and J. Sakovics (2003): "Olson VS. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict," Theory and Decision, Springer 55: 339-357.
Dixit, Avinash, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997): "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making", Journal of Political Economy

8. Uncertain Outcomes

9. Expressive Voting

10. Conclusion

link to first problem set
link to second problem set
link to third problem set